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This paper examines the idea that attraction to music is generated at a cognitive level
through the formation and activation of networks of interlinked “nodes.” Although the
networks involved are vast, the basic mechanism for activating the links is relatively
simple. Two comprehensive cognitive-behavioral models of musical engagement are
examined with the aim of identifying the underlying cognitive mechanisms and processes
involved in musical experience. A “dynamical minimalism” approach (after Nowak, 2004)
is applied to re-interpret musical engagement (listening, performing, composing, or
imagining any of these) and to revise the latest version of the reciprocal-feedback model
(RFM) of music processing. Speciﬁcally, a single cognitive mechanism of “spreading
activation” through previously associated networks is proposed as a pleasurable outcome
of musical engagement. This mechanism underlies the dynamic interaction of the various
components of the RFM, and can thereby explain the generation of positive affects in
the listener’s musical experience.This includes determinants of that experience stemming
from the characteristics of the individual engaging in the musical activity (whether listener,
composer, improviser, or performer), the situation and contexts (e.g., social factors), and
the music (e.g., genre, structural features). The theory calls for new directions for future
research, two being (1) further investigation of the components of the RFM to better
understand musical experience and (2) more rigorous scrutiny of common ﬁndings about
the salience of familiarity in musical experience and preference.
Keywords: musical experience, cognitive model, reciprocal-feedback model, spreading activation, mind-body,
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This paper presents a cognitive model that explains musical
experience. In particular, we seek a parsimonious account of the
many factors (or determinants) that contribute to musical prefer-
ence and pleasure. To this end some cognitive models of musical
experience are revisitedwith a view to generating testable hypothe-
ses. After reviewing two theoreticalmodels frommusic psychology
that will be integrated into a “cognitive-behavioral model of
musical experience,” a single underlying cognitive mechanism
is proposed that dynamically interacts with the various compo-
nents of the model to provide a simple but enriched theoretical
understanding of musical experience. We examine the empirical
data that the model explains, discuss some of its weaknesses, and
describe how it can be further tested.
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL MODELS
Models of esthetic musical experience have tried to explain basic,
fundamental responses to music, such as preference and taste (for
reviews, see Finnäs, 1989; North and Hargreaves, 1996; Hargreaves
and North, 2010). Preference in particular was considered suitable
for early, behaviorist studies because a simple dependent variable
measure could be employed, such as a scale of liking, with a range
of potential independent variables that could be used as predictors
(e.g., gender, age, and various musical characteristics). Although
the term“musical taste” has been used to mean a variety of things,
including preference (e.g., Schuessler, 1948) modern deﬁnitions
of musical taste recognize that the concept reﬂects the “overall
patterning of an individual’s preferences” (Hargreaves and North,
2010, p. 517), and so it is used to refer to long term, broader
likes and dislikes, such as particular musical styles, as distinct
from a short-term liking for a particular song or piece relative
to another. LeBlanc used both the terms preference and taste in
developing his model (LeBlanc, 1980, 1982; LeBlanc et al., 1999),
which consisted of a comprehensive set of components to explain
musical preference at a given point in the listening experience. The
model attempted to account for several important ﬁndings, while
acknowledging themultifaceted complexity and ﬁltering processes
that may be involved in such a preference decision.
Regarding predictors of the kind of music people liked, age,
and gender were considered among the most important at that
time. For example, females were found to have broader tastes in
music than males, and younger listeners exhibited greater “open-
earedness” (after Hargreaves, 1982) than older listeners. These two
components (age, or “maturation,” and sex) were part of a total
of 13 components that contributed to the “Listener” variables of
the model – the background factors of the individual that con-
tribute to preference. LeBlanc’s model was hierarchical, with the
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“music” (e.g., its physical properties) and the “cultural environ-
ment” (referring to who else is present or inﬂuencing the listening
experience – friends, authority ﬁgures, etc.) variables each occu-
pying the bottom level of the hierarchy. The “Listener” variables
are sandwiched between these two sets of variables (below) and
preference decision related components (above).
Like LeBlanc, many researchers argue that variables and com-
ponents such as these are interactive (Finnäs, 1989; Hargreaves
et al., 2005). That is, although LeBlanc proposed a hierarchy, each
level in the hierarchy had a link (arrow) that allowed one vari-
able in the model to be inﬂuenced by others regardless of its
hierarchical position. In their reciprocal-feedback model (RFM),
Hargreaves et al. (2005) made explicit in its title the interactivity
of the determinants of musical response, and reduced reliance on
any hierarchical order of processing. Furthermore, their model
intended to explain musical communication, which included
musical preference responses. In its early form, the RFM con-
sisted of four boxes, three being the determinants of the central
“response” box, which were labeled “Music,”“Listener,” and “Situ-
ation and Contexts.” Each of the boxes was linked to each of the
others. While there are some parallels with LeBlanc’s model, the
reciprocal-feedback format integrated new ﬁndings about what
was then known regarding music preference and communication
research. For example, while social interaction and esthetic emo-
tion are at the periphery of LeBlanc’s layout, emotion and social
context were amongst the contents of the Responses and the Sit-
uations and Contexts boxes respectively, reﬂecting the view that
emotions and the social context play an important role in prefer-
ence judgments, in accord with contemporary research on these
factors (Hargreaves and North, 1997; Juslin and Sloboda, 2001).
Research carried out after the publication of LeBlanc’s model
cemented the important role of emotion in the enjoyment of
music (Panksepp, 1995; Rickard, 2004; Schubert, 2007a). Perhaps
most importantly, as far as the present enquiry is concerned, the
RFM does not necessitate that preference is an output that results
from a hierarchy of inputs and ﬁlters. The response box includes
a range of “outputs,” including affective, physiological, and cogni-
tive components, that may or may not be inﬂuenced by a variety
of determinants.
The RFM underwent additional reﬁnements, including the
proposition of a “performance” model which ran in parallel with
the response model, and the further proposition that the two
models in combination might be used to explain musical commu-
nication. The most recent development of the RFM (Hargreaves
et al., 2012) involved the synthesis of the “response” and “perfor-
mance”models into a singlemodel inwhich the central component
of the central box is speciﬁed as “Imagination,” which is mani-
fested in two main ways, namely in production and perception.
Perception refers to the components of the responses box in the
earlier version of the RFM, and production refers to all the com-
ponents involved in the expressive and motor outputs of the
performer/composer, and indeed in musical creativity. The most
radical component of the revised model is the inclusion of the
imagination factor. Imagination is presented as the central core of
the model because it represents the cognitive processes underly-
ing musical experience. Whereas the original model was intended
to explain musical response, performance, and communication,
placing imagination at the core of the model allows for the inte-
gration of all of the creative acts involved in music making, and
also changes the nature of the model such that it now deals in
essence with the mental activity involved in music processing.
Indeed, it will be argued here that the revised model provides
an apt explanation that covers much of the sum total of musical
experience.
REDUCTION OF THE PROBLEM
The models described above represent musical experience as a
collection of categorical blocks, each of which is able to mutually
interact with the others. They reﬂect the evidence at the time
at which the research was available, and have historical origins
in the philosophical position referred to as reductionism – the
separable components responsible for the emergent phenomenon
under investigation (in this case, musical experience). While this
leaves us with an understanding of musical experiences that is
iteratively deeper, it also raises the question of how to manage the
increasing complexity of such a model. Nowak (2004) argued that
itmaybepossible toﬁnd a compromise between incomprehensible
complexity with richness of understanding, versus simplicity and
triviality. He proposed a system of theory development referred
to as “dynamical minimalism” in which the explanations of the
behavior of systems can be understood as evolving in time through
repeated interaction of simple mechanisms.
As mentioned, Hargreaves (2012) proposed that imagination
(and its components) is at the core of the revised RFM, and recent
developments in cognitive psychology suggest that the concept of
imagination may be the place to ﬁnd a simple mechanism. In the
present model, imagination needs to be understood in two ways:
ﬁrst, it refers to the self-reportable, experiential level of fantasy,
make-believe, remembering, planning, and so forth, in the absence
of physically sensed stimuli (sight, sound, etc.). Second, it can be
understood at a cognitive level as involving different networks of
association that are a part of mental processing. Those networks
function as a large, distributed set of nodes that are responsible
for the formation1, storage and retrieval of memories, both motor
and perceptual (Fuster, 1997), but equally important, they are
involved in the formation of novel associations and activities. This
second concept of imagination, particularly through its interac-
tion with the ﬁrst, experiential concept of imagination, provides a
parsimonious explanation not only of responses to music, but also
of the creation of music as part of the production (e.g., playing,
composing, improvising) process.
Hargreaves (2012) indicates the utility of the network approach
by identifying three types: musical, social-cultural, and “personal”
networks, and these align with Folkestad’s 2012 conception that
all music heard is stored in the mind of the listener in what he calls
a “personal inner music library.” Social-cultural networks may
be thought of as determining the ways in which musical interac-
tions and experiences are shaped by cultural norms and contexts,
such as hearing traditional Indian music when eating at an Indian
restaurant (North et al., 2004; Yeoh and North, 2009). Personal
1In this paper, “formation” is to be thought of as the apprehension or bringing
into functionality an otherwise unused cognitive network. It is assumed that vast
networks are “physically” present, but serve a function or representation only as a
result of experience and maturation.
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networks are the most individualized networks that map out the
various experiences and associations of an individual: they do
so by combining aspects of musical and social-cultural networks.
Thus, imagination can be seen as operating through a collection
of interacting cognitive networks.
A criticism of this version of the model is that, as a result of
the inclusion of imagination, the theory traverses different lev-
els of explanation (e.g., see Carlston, 2010). The original version
of the model was largely phenomenological, taken here to mean
behavioral (e.g., self-reporting the liking a piece of music) and
observable (age, gender, personality traits assessed through a psy-
chometric instrument, the characteristics of a piece of music, and
so on). Imagination as conceived here, however, consists of the
internal workings of the mind that are concerned with musical
experiences which may not always be directly accessible through
behavior and observation, and may even be contrary to the obser-
vations and behaviors of the individual having them. In response
to such a criticism, Hackman (2003) argued that examination of
different levels of explanation can lead tomore robust understand-
ing and “ﬁndings that otherwise would have escaped notice” (p.
910), making the addition of the imagination factor even more
signiﬁcant for the purpose of theory development.
Our intention here is accordingly to identify a minimum num-
ber of underlying cognitive mechanisms that help explain the
behavioral and observable data, and to identify and justify that
which possesses the most explanatory power.
SPREADING ACTIVATION
We suggest that the single, best available contender for explaining
musical experience and esthetic pleasure is spreading activation
theory (e.g., Schubert, 1996, 2009–2010, 2012). Spreading activa-
tion refers directly to the mental processing portion of the RFM in
that it depends on a mental architecture consisting of a vast net-
work of nodes (as does the imagination factor of theRFM).When a
perceptionor actionoccurs, specializednetworks representing that
perception/action process are activated through the connections
of that network. For example, the act of walking requires neural
networks that prepare for and execute the act by sending motor
instructions including bodily co-ordination (Cruse et al., 1995).
The instructions are not explicit, but are distributed through the
network as a result of learning andmaturation (Collins and Loftus,
1975; Smith and Queller, 2004).
The principles of spreading activation can be found in early
English speaking psychological writings through the work of
William James, and in particular his elementary law of association:
“When two elementary brain-processes have been active together
or in succession, one of them, on reoccurring, tends to propagate
its excitement into the other” (James, 1890/1950, p. 566). In the
case of perception, a familiar visual stimulus will activate one set
of networks, and if that visual stimulus is of a musician, for exam-
ple, another set of networks may be activated as a result of the
music that the musician is playing. The mental representations of
the music and the visual stimulus (of the musician) are combined
to form another, integrated network (e.g., Anderson, 1988; Fuster,
1997; Fuster et al., 2000; Laughlin and Sejnowski, 2003). These
combinations of networks are linked together by the appropria-
tion of a new network (if the connection has not previously been
made). These representations and associations in some psycholog-
ical models are referred to as long-term memory (Sweatt, 2003).
The later re-activation of a part of the network [e.g., the sight
(perception) of the musician] can activate the associated portions
(e.g., the music that the musician previously played) even in the
physical absence of that additional stimulus. Each of the concepts
that the different networks represent – whether it be the piece of
music, the components of the music, the musician, the environ-
ment of the music – are called “nodes” (Anderson, 1983). Total
activation is therefore determined by the combination of quasi-
digital transmission of signals via nodes. The nodes transmit or
they do not – on or off. It is the sum of the transmitting node
outputs that form overall activation and, in effect, produces the
intensity of the arousal.
Martindale (1984, 1988) proposed a simple mechanism that
explained hedonic preference in terms of these interconnected
nodes, namely that the process of activation of nodes is in itself
pleasurable, provided that the listener is in a disinterested state.
The theory speciﬁcally addresses the circumstance of esthetic expe-
rience (such as playing and/or listening to music), which was
adopted and modiﬁed by Schubert (1996, 2009–2010) and which
led to the development of a spreading activation theory of esthetic
and creative experience (Schubert, 2012). An important point in
the model that we are proposing, and in that of Martindale, is that
the basic tenet of the model requires that the listener be in a state
of esthetic contemplation, which we will refer to as an esthetic
context (e.g., Frijda, 1989). Thus, listening to “music” in a danger-
ous environment, or day-to-day sounds (such as the ring tone of a
mobile phone, or jack-hammer at a construction site) is not here
considered as being in an esthetic context (for further discussion,
see Schubert, 2009–2010).
EXPLAINING MUSICAL EXPERIENCE THROUGH A
DYNAMICALLY MINIMAL MODEL OF SPREADING
ACTIVATION
It is possible to build an explanatory sequence based on the
assumption of a simple mechanism that drives esthetic (in this
case musical) experience. The spreading activation thesis predicts,
within an esthetic context (1) that a mental representation (node)
must be activated in order to generate esthetic pleasure, which
implies that; (2) a representation must be present, meaning that:
(3) themental representationmust ﬁrst have been“formed.”These
three principles can be satisﬁed in various ways. Formation of
mental representation is the basis of learning and experience. For
example, a mental representation can be formed, without con-
scious attention, by mere exposure (Zajonc, 1968; Monahan et al.,
2000). Mere exposure and any other driver of mental represen-
tation formation can be translated into the phenomenological
world as familiarity. Familiarity – a collative variable in the RFM
(Berlyne, 1970) – can therefore be explained through the presence
of mental representation of a piece of music, a style of music, a
performer, and so on. The activation of that mental representation
is pleasurable, and is reﬂected in numerous studies (see reviews of
music preference cited above, as well as Gaver and Mandler, 1987;
Schubert, 2007a; Pereira et al., 2011).
Studies in the social psychology of music have presented an
increasingly sophisticated understanding of musical experience.
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Using spreading activation as the underlying mechanistic driver
of musical experience, social context may be viewed as a facilitator
or inhibitor of musical exposure. Being with a friend, having a
role model, or wanting to be part of the in-group (Tarrant et al.,
2001; Pitts, 2002) will inﬂuence the quantity and type of music
to which one is exposed, but the music will also form associa-
tions with the context and social connections that are experienced
during the music listening experiences. When playing music at a
campﬁre with friends for the ﬁrst time, the network of associa-
tions with the environment (the campﬁre and atmosphere), the
friends and the music will form new networks which represent
the co-occurrence of the music and social context, and thus future
experiences involving any or all of these components can lead to
a large amount of activation spreading through the network at a
subsequent activation involving any or all of those components
(the campﬁre, the friends and/or the music). One event (e.g., the
music) may trigger – activate – another (e.g., memory of being
at the camp). A positive memory may produce a sense of awe,
pleasure or frisson (Lowis, 1998). Our argument is that spread-
ing activation underlies these affective responses: it explains why
situations and contexts are such an important part of the musical
experience, and suggests that the external inﬂuence of context,
while critically important, can at the same time be explained
mechanistically.
The social connections that inﬂuence an individual’s musical
experience (friends, inﬂuential people, etc.) have relevance also for
another concept that has received considerable recent attention,
namely that of emotional contagion and empathy (Sawyer, 2006;
Juslin andVästfjäll, 2008;Woody and McPherson, 2010). When we
are with people we like we tend to adopt their mood or emotional
state (Hatﬁeld et al., 2009). We are happy to hear of a friend’s good
news, and feel sad when she/he has been through a difﬁcult time
(Cialdini et al., 1997). This “capturing” of mood is referred to as
emotional contagion, and when the individual is showing involved
concern with that person we refer to the experience as empathy
(Watt, 2005). In neuroscientiﬁc research a picture is beginning to
emerge that such empathic experiences are produced by activa-
tion of, among other things, mirror circuits (Preston and De Waal,
2002; Platek et al., 2005; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007; DeWaal, 2008;
Walter, 2012; Schubert, 2013). The assertion that mirror circuits
are the mechanism of empathy is not without controversy (Decety,
2010), although the presence of a specialist circuit for processing
our strong sensitivity to interhuman interaction is plausible, if not
biologically critical (e.g., see Walter, 2012). Connection with oth-
ers – as a cause or result of empathy – has an important role to play
in musical experience, too (Woody and McPherson, 2010). These
social interactions lead to activation of relevant networks repre-
senting social engagement. The key point is that the linking of
these cognitive networks with (pieces of) music, through the prin-
ciple of spreading activation (which is pleasurable in an esthetic
context) provides a mechanistic explanation of the context deter-
minants of the RFM. Although some recent work on contagion
comes from neuroscientiﬁc research (e.g., Gallese, 2003; Singer
and Lamm, 2009; Decety, 2010), the current account employs an
explicitly cognitive framework.
Returning to our camp ﬁre example, the spreading activation
account proposes that the social relations among the individuals
present are activating a large number of contagion/mirror circuits
concomitantly, and that the connections between circuits these
and the music create even larger amounts of activation. In short, it
may be that social interaction is an evolutionarily important, con-
venient way of activating many nodes, and musical activation links
these experiences together, allowing later listening to that music
to re-activate networks of memories and feelings (Chartrand and
Dalton, 2009).
The spreading activation mechanism fulﬁls the criterion of
being minimal because it is a single, important principle that
dynamically interacts with the various components of musical
experience – the more activation, the more pleasure. We provide
a schematic representation that shows how the mechanism uniﬁes
the components of the RFM in Figure 1. Such an approach is easy
to criticize because it explains a great deal with very little, and
some of the criticisms will be addressed in the following section.
PREDICTIONS AND CRITICISMS
The current thesis proposes that the spreading activation mech-
anism presents both a parsimonious explanation of an extremely
complex set of phenomena, and provides some testable hypotheses
that may lead to further modiﬁcations or rejection.
In terms of prediction, spreading activation implies that a men-
tal representation must be present before activation can begin.
The self-reported, introspective, phenomenological experience of
a mental representation will, in its simplest form, be the sensation
of recognition, and will therefore often be connected with famil-
iarity (Gabrieli, 1998; Jeneson et al., 2010). In this respect, a naïve
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of spreading activation through
the components of the reciprocal-feedback model (RFM; based on
Hargreaves, 2012). The arrows connecting the determinant boxes in
previous versions of the RFM have been replaced here by networks of
nodes, shown in schematic form in the background, and representing a
cognitive level of explanation. The networks form mental representations of
perceptions, actions, emotions, and thoughts, including those pertaining to
the three determinants of musical experience: music, situations, and
contexts, and Person (Listener/composer/improviser/performer). Activation
of one part of the network spreads activation to other previously associated
networks. The central role of imagination is represented schematically in
the diagram in terms of musical experience (foreground), and of internal,
mental representation (background).
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interpretation of the spreading activationmechanism suggests that
familiarity will be the most important predictor of esthetic expe-
rience, and in particular, of preference. While there is much to say
about this prediction, a few advance comments about prototype
theory are required.
As with spreading activation, the theory of prototypicality pre-
dicts that people will like the most prototypical music that they
hear: that is, music that sounds most similar to their existing men-
tal representations of musical styles and pieces. Prototypicality
theory was championed by Martindale and colleagues (Martin-
dale and Moore, 1988, 1989; Martindale et al., 1990) but fell out
of favor in the late 1990s for several reasons. One important rea-
son was discussed by North and Hargreaves (2000), who argued
that prototypicality may have found support in the ﬁrst place
because of the stimuli used to examine the theory. The importance
of prototypicality, they argued, was proportional to the extent
to which the stimuli in question varied in their prototypicality.
Spreading activation theory (which, incidentally, was inspired by
the work of Martindale – who had in place many of the princi-
ples of the present theory) does not imply any bias as to which
component of the RFM will be a better predictor of esthetic pref-
erence. Familiarity is one, and only one consciousmanifestation of
pre-existing mental representations, and explains prototypicality
too, because prototypicality is the result of networks represent-
ing one stimulus (a novel piece of music) activating all “adjacent”
networks that share features with the novel piece, should they
exist. Familiarity is not an exclusive factor in making predictions
about liking, as it intrinsically involves other factors. Our proposed
theory consequently departs from Martindale’s detailed focus on
prototypicality.
Furthermore, our theory draws attention to the way that pref-
erence for musical style interacts with preference for individual
musical pieces, which lends itself to easier direct inspection, such
as comparisons between music played in two or more different
styles and contexts. The context that activates the greater number
of mental representations – for example through exposure and
cultural norms, will be more liked. Evidence of this prediction
can be found in a study by North and Hargreaves (1997). In that
study, pop songs played in styles that were more familiar to the
participants were liked more than when played in a less familiar
style, even if the liked styles were not that of the “original” piece.
One important esthetic principle that spreading activation does
not explain is why familiarity can increase without monotonic
increase in enjoyment. That is, it is generally accepted in the lit-
erature that preference increases with familiarity, but at a certain
point, when a piece becomes “over” familiar, enjoyment dimin-
ishes. This conclusion is encapsulated in the principle of the
inverted-U curve (Berlyne, 1970; Heyduk, 1975; Hargreaves, 1984;
Schubert, 2010), and was ﬁrst identiﬁed by the early German
psychologists, particularly through the work of Wundt (1905).
To retain the spreading activation mechanism explanation, an
additional mechanism could be added, as proposed by Martin-
dale, such that an “activation threshold” that dynamically alters
how much activation is required before a node (representing a
network) can be activated. That is, massed exposure to an esthetic
stimulus will lead, in general, to an increase in the activation
threshold, eventually stopping the node (the one representing the
stimulus that is being presented) from activating. The consequent
blocking reduces the amount of activation that can spread through
the network (for more details, see Martindale, 1984; Schubert,
1996; Schellenberg et al., 2012). However, our aim is deliberately
to set a research agenda that identiﬁes the single best explanatory
mechanism for esthetic experience, without excluding additional
mechanisms from explaining musical experience and preference.
There is a second related issue concerning the notion of
familiarity, which also requires detailed exposition. Put sim-
ply, our description so far suggests that exposure, familiarity,
and spreading activation are similar concepts. However, the
notion of conscious attention means that it seems sensible to
differentiate these terms (Bargh and Ferguson, 2000; Hubbard,
2007). Conscious attention directs the nature of the representa-
tion formed (or activated) so that anything in consciousness at
the time inﬂuences the representation that is formed (or acti-
vated). For instance, if one hears a piece of music and is told
that it represents a given musical style, then this information
will become part of the representation of that piece. In this con-
text, exposure can be equated with the perceptual mechanism of
having heard the music, whereas familiarity implies the forming
and repeated activation of a particular node (or set of nodes),
which seems analogous to the concept of consciousness: it can
be argued therefore that familiarity equates to “exposure plus
consciousness,” and that spreading activation is the process by
which consciousness shapes exposure into familiar music that is
cognitively meaningful.
A clear prediction follows from this, namely that the greater
the degree of conscious effort devoted to active processing of
a given exposure to music so, it would be assumed, the greater
the extent and richness of the nodes activated. In contrast, mere
exposure to music with little or no ensuing conscious effort
(i.e., spreading activation) would lead to relatively little activa-
tion of a limited number of nodes and an impoverished pattern of
activation.
However, mere exposure still has an important role to play
in mental representation, and this can be further exempliﬁed in
the importance of repeated material used within a piece of music
(Ockelford,2005).Within-piece repetitionhas the ability to engage
the listener’s attention and emotional response (Livingstone et al.,
2011; Margulis, 2013a,b) as well as with-in piece repetition with
elaboration and ornamentation, such as the Theme andVariations
form (Keller and Schubert, 2011) and the“hook” in popular music
(Traut, 2005). This furthers the present argument that the search
for existing mental representations, which can be of a musical
fragment, will lead to a positive affective outcome for the listener.
Our theory, therefore, draws together disparate, signiﬁcant
explanations in cognitive musical organization (Deliege, 2001a),
by proposing that terminology used to indicate familiar musical
fragments, a particular musical style (North and Hargreaves, 1997;
Deliege, 2001b), a musical schema (Bharucha, 1987; Justus and
Bharucha, 2002) and prototypically (op. cit.) all point to mental
representations that are activated by music factors speciﬁed within
the RFM (which here includes performing and imagining). This
is in addition to the veridical activation of linked mental repre-
sentations that will occur when listening to a familiar piece of
music.
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Perhaps the major criticism of spreading activation theory is
that it explains too much, and therefore lacks predictive utility.
Our response to this criticism is that it predicts that what is impor-
tant in musical experience (that is, in an esthetic context) is the
richness of networks that themusic activates, whether this be other
music of a similar style (such as prototypicality), memories of past
events (“evaluative condition” – see for example, Juslin and Väst-
fjäll, 2008), contextual information, and so on. No single theory
has been cited that predicts that the “richest” musical experiences
will be acquired by the maximization of the spread of activation to
different cognitive networks within and across the various com-
ponents of the RFM. Interestingly, William James, again, showed
premonitions of the notion of “spreading activation” but with the
missing assertion that this is a pleasurable activity when it occurs
in an esthetic context:
The amount of activity at any given point in the brain-cortex is the sum
of the tendencies of all other points to discharge into it, such tendencies
being proportionate (1) to the number of times the excitement of each
other point may have accompanied that of the point in question; (2)
to the intensity of such excitements; and (3) to the absence of any rival
point functionally disconnected with the ﬁrst point, into which the
discharges might be diverted (p. 567).
Our dynamical minimalism approach has four advantages over
other theories of musical experience, namely that: (1) It crystallizes
the need to distinguish between the various components of musi-
cal experiences (complexity, prototypicality, but also personality,
social and contextual factors and so forth), which are brought
into focus by the RFM; (2) It predicts that in an esthetic con-
text any of these components can contribute to positive esthetic
experiences; (3) While other cognitive theories of musical pref-
erence lay out the various determinants of musical preference,
they rarely identify the reason for the generation of preference or
pleasure: our theory explicitly identiﬁes the causal mechanism of
musical (esthetic) pleasure – spreading activation, and (4) Our
theory sets a research agenda that requires a focus on the rela-
tive contribution of each component of the RFM to the overall
experience.
CONCLUSION
The single cognitive mechanism of spreading activation provides
a potential solution to the problem of achieving dynamical mini-
malism in theories of musical experience. Spreading activation, we
have proposed, is a basic mechanism that interacts with, is shaped
by, and forms the various components of the RFM over time.
This provides some obvious insights into the nature of musical
preference and experience. It predicts that various components
of the RFM (musical determinants, cultural and social factors,
and listener characteristics) are each contributors to the esthetic
experience, and therefore that research should focus on balanced
comparisons of the various components and their proportional
contribution to the esthetic/musical experience. Of all the deter-
minants, current evidence suggests that familiarity or exposure is
the “driving” principle of musical experience (see also Schubert,
2007a; Witvliet and Vrana, 2007; Pereira et al., 2011). Consider,
for example, the ﬁndings reported at the time of the LeBlanc
model related to gender – that young adolescent females have
a more positive attitude to music than their male counterparts
(Hargreaves et al., 1995). If a cultural norm encourages females to
listen to more musical styles than males (e.g., males may be con-
ditioned to believe that some music is less “cool” or less palatable
than other music, and therefore avoid it: Tarrant et al., 2001), it is
still the differential amounts of exposure, and therefore exposure
and familiarity, that underlies the development of preference, not
gender differences per se.
But the current model clariﬁes the idea that familiarity and
recognition are variables available to the introspection of the
individual. Familiarity does not directly identify the cogni-
tive mechanism that underlies the experience. That is, if we
understand familiarity as being a result of the “formation” of
networks (nodes), we become open not only to how spread-
ing activation can manifest itself in consciousness as familiarity,
but that it can also explain the processes of other variables in
the RFM. In other words, familiarity is important, but how
important is it with respect to other variables and determi-
nants, and how might music psychologists be able to undertake
valid comparisons between the effects of two or more of these
factors (e.g., familiarity versus prototypicality)? The present
thesis does not answer this question, but draws attention to
it.
Wehave therefore attempted toprovide a dynamicallyminimal-
ist explanationof the comprehensiveRFMproposedbyHargreaves
and colleagues. A simple underlying mechanism – that spread-
ing activation through cognitive networks generates pleasure and
other positive affects – dynamically underlies, and is shaped by, the
various components of the RFM, and can explain the development
of musical experiences over time. That is, the musical affects of the
components of the RFM can be largely explained by the spreading
activation mechanism.
The importance of social context is expressed in terms of the
additional amounts of activation the listener experiences when
the music is connected with other people, situations and environ-
ments, and interrelationships among those. For example, the large
amount of activation that can occur when listening to music that a
friend likes, or in a social context such as a campﬁre, may provide
a simple, mechanistic explanation of much that is known about
the social psychology of music. It may also be the case that the
circuits related to empathic behaviors are recruited for activation
of a “relationship” with the music itself – between the emotion
expressed by the music and the listener’s felt emotion (Gabriels-
son, 2002; Dibben, 2004; Kallinen and Ravaja, 2006; Schubert,
2007b; Evans and Schubert, 2008; Schubert, 2013).
Further research will be able to reveal whether this simple
cognitive mechanism of spreading activation may help us to
understand which of the various components of the RFM account
for the largest amount of variance in response and in experi-
ence. While reducing the rich and powerful experiences of musical
engagement to a simple mechanism may seem overly simplistic to
some, from a research perspective, it has the potential to pro-
vide stimulation for the generation of many new hypotheses and
signiﬁcant research directions.
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